

Embedded Commands: The *That*-Clause, Infinitival Clause and Gerundive Clause Complements

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Abstract: This paper discusses the syntax and semantics of embedded commands in English. It focuses on the *that*-clause, the infinitival clause and the gerundive clause complements of verbs of commanding. The *that*-clause complement is shown to be a CP, and the infinitival clause complement is shown to be a VP. The gerundive clause complement is shown to be a VP, but it is argued that it is not a true gerundive clause complement. The semantics of embedded commands is shown to be different from that of main clauses. The *that*-clause complement is shown to be a CP, and the infinitival clause complement is shown to be a VP. The gerundive clause complement is shown to be a VP, but it is argued that it is not a true gerundive clause complement. The semantics of embedded commands is shown to be different from that of main clauses.

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There are certain verbs, adjectives and head nouns in English which trigger uninflected verbs in the embedded clauses. This paper investigates commands which are embedded as imperative *that*-clauses in relation to infinitival clauses and gerundive clauses. These sentences carry the propositional content of order, determination, request, urgency and advisability and they are marked by the illocutionary force-indicating device which, in part, is realized as an uninflected verb as a result of the deletion of a modal.

It is argued that the hypothetical *should* is contained in the underlying structure of the imperative *that*-clause, since it can be differentiated from the emotive *should* which is triggered by emotive verbs that express emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow and pleasure.

It has been demonstrated that there are interesting correlations between semantic features of the requestive proposition and syntactic behavior of imperative *that*-clauses, as opposed to declarative *that*-clauses of the assertive proposition.

1.0 Introduction

This paper examines commands which are embedded as imperative *that*-clauses, infinitival clauses or gerundive clauses. It attempts to capture the correlation between semantic properties of predicates that attract embedded commands and syntactic behavior of these predicates.

1.1 Principal sources

The exploration on commands from philosophical and linguistic viewpoints must be attributed to Austin, Searle, Ross, Fraser, Grice, Gordon and Lakoff, to mention but a few. This section introduces their contributions briefly in relation to our topic in question.

1.1.1 Austin's performatives versus constatives

The recent exploration of speech acts was first engendered by J. L. Austin who differentiated three types of linguistic acts which he called 'locutionary acts', 'perlocutionary acts' and 'illocutionary acts'. According to Austin (1962), 'locutionary acts' refer to a speaker's acts of saying something in order to communicate. 'Perlocutionary acts' are the by-products of communication, that is, they are acts the speaker performs by saying something. 'Illocutionary acts' are speech acts that the speaker performs *in* saying something. Thus, 'performative' utterances are to do something in saying something, whereas 'constative' utterances are to describe something. Compare the following sentences in the sense of Austin:

- (1a) He states that the annual rate of inflation is more than ten percent.
- (1b) I (hereby) christen this jet 'the Spirit of 1977'

In (1a), the assertion is made with respect to true or false

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value, whereas in (1b), the uttering of the sentence is to perform the action referred to, that is, christening a jet. In this sense, (1b) carries illocutionary force as opposed to (1a) which does not. Austin (1962:145) points out that in the constative utterance, the illocutionary aspect of the speech act is abstracted out and concentration is on what remains—the locutionary aspect. On the other hand, in the performative utterance, attention is paid to the illocutionary force of the utterance. Performatives cannot be true or false but can be 'felicitous' or 'infelicitous'. If felicitous, performatives function happily; if infelicitous, performatives are either 'misfires' or 'abuses'. In misfires (Austin 1962:18), the act is not achieved, therefore it is void. In abuses, the act is achieved, but achieved unhappily.

There are certain syntactic correlations required by the explicit performatives such as in (1b): (1) Sentences must be well-formed when the adverb *hereby* is inserted. (2) The subject must be the first person while the indirect object must be the second person. (3) The tense must be present and non-progressive except for one verb. The verb *offer* used in the future tense as in (1c) is a performative:

(1c) I'll offer you fifty dollars for trimming the trees in our garden.

(4) The sentence must be affirmative and simple declarative. (5) Finally, as pointed out by Lakoff (1969) and Cattell (1973), performatives cannot take questions as in (1d):

(1d) *I christen this jet 'the Spirit of 1977', don't I?

The tag question in (1d) is ludicrous due to the fact that, when a performative sentence is uttered, the speaker is fully aware of his or her authoritative act, and it is tautological to ask for a confirmation.

1.1.2 Searle's speech acts

Searle (1969) pursues Austin's idea closely in *Speech Acts* and attempts to state the necessary and sufficient condition for performing illocutionary acts and to abstract from them the semantic rules for the use of the explicit performative verb. Searle argues that language is rule governed and that illocutionary acts are also rule governed.

1.1.3 Ross' performative analysis

Ross (1970b) gives syntactic arguments in favor of postulating an underlying explicit performative verb for every sentence. In the underlying representation, all declarative sentences have a performative verb of saying as the main verb of the higher clause, and the first person as subject, and the second person as object. On the surface structure, Performative Deletion obligatorily applies to declarative sentences. Ross claims that the illocutionary force is the meaning of what is said and, therefore, it has to be represented in the underlying structure.

1.1.4 Fraser's ceremonial and vernacular illocutionary acts

There are other attempts to find syntactic correlates to account for the meaning of the explicit performative verbs. Fraser (1971, 1974) has distinguished between 'ceremonial' illocutionary acts and 'vernacular' illocutionary acts. The former refer to performative acts which rely on some codified conventions or institutionalized situations such as legal activity exemplified by *convict*, religious activity exemplified by *christen*, governmental activity exemplified by *enact*, and sport activity exemplified by *declare safe*. The vernacular illocutionary acts denote acts of a general, everyday variety such as acts of asserting such as *assert*, acts of evaluating such as *judge*, acts of suggesting such as *suggest*, and several others. Fraser, however, denies that there is any correlation between syntactic behavior and performative verbs.

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1.1.5 Grice's indirect speech acts

By the use of symbolic logic, Grice (1967) has attempted to relate logical structure to a natural language through implicature, which is the meaning that is not explicitly stated in the logical structure but is derived from it. According to Grice, the implicatures can be conventional or conversational. 'Conventional' implicatures are semantic entailments which rest on the meanings of words in a sentence. On the other hand, 'conversational' implicatures refer to utterances which may convey one meaning as uttered and another as understood.

1.1.6 Gordon and Lakoff's conversational postulates

Following Grice's implicatures, Gordon and Lakoff (1971) have proposed that grammar should contain a set of 'conversational postulates' formulated on implicatures relative to the characterization of a set of contexts. A speaker can convey a conversational meaning as opposed to the literal meaning by asserting the speaker-based felicity conditions or questioning the addressee-based felicity conditions:

- (2a) I want you to take the garbage.
- (2b) Can you take out the garbage?
- (2c) Would you be willing to take out the garbage?
- (2d) Will you take out the garbage? (Gordon-Lakoff 1971:64)

Example (2a) is a request made by asserting the speaker-based felicity condition in that the speaker wants the action performed; the speaker assumes that the addressee is willing and able to perform the action and that the addressee would not perform the action unless requested to do so. Similarly, (2b), (2c) and (2d) are requests made by questioning the addressee-based felicity conditions. A conversationally implied meaning which has illocutionary force can only be conveyed if the literal meaning is not intended. Thus, indirect speech acts are made by the use of


utterances which include as their propositions an intrinsic condition of the act being indirectly conveyed.

1.2 Simple commands versus embedded commands

In a direct commanding act three items are necessarily involved: a person who commands, a person who receives the command, and the command itself. Commands can be direct like simple commands, or indirect like embedded commands. In simple commands, the commander expressed by the higher subject *I* is obligatorily deleted as well as the receiver of the command expressed by the indirect object. Only the content of a command is conveyed as in the following:

- (3a) Go immediately.
- (3b) Come here on time, please.
- (3c) Don't pay the bill for the defective merchandise.
- (3d) Do not litter the lawn.

In the sense of Austin (1962) and Ross (1970b), these simple commands are embedded into a higher clause which contains a performative verb *order* in the underlying structure. Sentence (3a), for example, is derived from the following logical structure:



On certain emphatic occasions commands may take the surface forms which resemble the logical structures. For example, we have embedded commands in the following sentences used in

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formal situations:

- (5a) I order that you go immediately.
- (5b) I request that you come here on time.
- (5c) I suggest that you not pay the bill for the defective merchandise.
- (5d) I beg that you not litter the lawn.

Syntactically, (5a-d) are declarative sentences. These sentences, however, convey a 'requestive' proposition which is equivalent to a command, rather than an assertive proposition which is equivalent to a statement. In indirect commands such as (5a-d), the commander is the higher subject *I*; the receiver of the command is *you*; the commanding act is conveyed by performative verbs such as *order*, *request*, *suggest* and *beg*; the content of the command is conveyed by their complements.

Following Searle (1969), sentences are analyzed into two parts: (1) the propositional content which is the sense of the sentence, and (2) the illocutionary force-indicating device which is the grammatical device that determines, in part, the illocutionary act. For example, in (3a) and (5a), the propositional content can approximately be stated as 'you go immediately', which is conveyed by the embedded clause, given the hypothesis that the Performative Deletion rule has applied to (3a) but not to (5a). In (3a) the illocutionary force-indicating device deals with the imperative marker which consists of the deletion of the subject, an uninflected verb and commanding intonation. In (5a) the illocutionary force indicating device is the overt use of a performative verb of command which attracts the imperative *that*-clause.

In simple commands it is mandatory that the subject of a sentence be the speaker *I* and the person addressed be *you*. This claim is supported mainly by two arguments given by Chomsky (1955), and Katz and Postal (1964).

First, the reflexives in the imperative sentences allow only

yourself and *yourselves* but no other persons:

- (6a) Shave $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yourself/yourselfs.} \\ *myself/*ourselves. \\ *herself/*themselves. \end{array} \right.$
- (6b) Don't forget to show $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{yourself} \\ *myself \\ *himself \end{array} \right\}$ at the party.

The fact that only the reflexivization of the **second person** *you* is permitted in imperatives indicates that the **controller is the second person** *you* (singular or plural). This points out that the Reflexivization rule must precede the **YOU** Deletion rule.

Second, in tag questions such as the following, only *you* is allowed:

- (7a) Speak loudly, will $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{you} \\ *she \\ *we \end{array} \right\}$?
- (7b) Please step off the lawn, will $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{you} \\ *she \\ *they \end{array} \right\}$?

Since the pronoun in tag questions must be a copy of the subject of the main clause, examples (7a-b) indicate that the deleted subject of the imperatives must be the second person *you*.

However, in indirect commands such as the following,

- (8a) The admiral commanded that the navy be on the alert.
- (8b) The President recommended that the tax of the low-income people be cut in half.

the higher subject and the indirect object need not be *I* and *you*, respectively. In such instances, sentences containing the embedded imperatives are similar to statements. In terms of the requestive proposition, however, they are similar to true imperatives which carry illocutionary force.

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In direct commands, the tense is always present since it is not possible to command someone to do things of the past as in (9a) as opposed to (9b). When the subject *you* is deleted, the underlying copula *be* appears tenseless and uninflected as in (9d) as opposed to (9c):

(9a) *Came again.

(9b) Come again.

(9c) *Are punctual.

(9d) Be punctual.

Similarly, in indirect commands the tense of the imperative *that*-clauses remains neutral as in (10b) and (10d) as opposed to (10a) and (10c), respectively, even if the tense of the main verb is in the past:

(10a) *I ordered that he went.

(10b) I ordered that he go.

(10c) *I commanded that you were punctual.

(10d) I commanded that you be punctual.

In direct commands modals cannot precede imperative verbs as in the following:

(11a) *Can call the police.

(11b) *May call the fire engine.

(11c) *Must report it to the FBI.

(11d) *Shall shout for help.

(11e) *Don't will wait for another hour.

In indirect commands, however, the hypothetical *should* which refers to obligation may precede the verbs in the embedded clause as in (12a-b), but not other modals as in (12c-d):

(12a) John ordered that Mary should call the police.

(12b) The chairman commanded that the victims should report

the nation-wide mail fraud to the FBI.

(12c) *The police ordered that the cars could have a U turn.

(12d) *The fireman ordered that all the windows would be closed.

1.3 Types of verbs of command which attract imperative *that*-clauses

The imperative *that*-clause complements are those that are triggered by the verbs of command, and those that contain a subjunctive verb rather than an indicative verb. These verbs which attract imperative *that*-clauses are those which incorporate the meanings of order, request, permission/prohibition, recommendation, wish/intent, decision/determination and necessity.

1.3.1 Verbs of order (e.g. command)

Some verbs are strongly performative in that the speaker, by virtue of his authority, commands someone to bring about an action or the state of affairs specified in the proposition. These verbs include *command*, *decree*, *dictate*, *direct*, *charge*, *enact*, *order* and *prescribe*. For example, the imperative *that*-clauses which contain the hypothetical *should* as in (13a) and (13b), or its deletion as in (13c) are triggered by verbs of command such as *command*, *order* and *give an order*.

(13a) The pirate chief *commanded* that the prisoners *should be* shot. (Hornby 1974:169)

(13b) The judge *ordered* that the prisoner *should be* remanded. (Hornby 1974:601)

(13c) The judge *gave an order* that the documents *be* subpoenaed.

Some verb phrases such as *give an order* and *give a command* which incorporate some meanings of command as in (13c) take the imperative *that*-clause as a complex NP complement.

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1.3.2 Verbs of request (e.g. request)

Verbs of request are equally strongly performative in the sense that the speaker conveys a sense of urgency or entreaty although he may or may not have the authority to command. Some of these verbs are *ask*₂, *beg*, *demand*, *entreat*, *expect*₂, *implore*, *insist*₂, *request*, *specify* and *urge*. For example:

- (14a) He also *demanded* that Kennedy *take* additional measures to increase international tension. (1080E1B11)
- (14b) It *urged* that the next legislature *provide* enabling funds and *reset* the effective date so that an orderly implementation of the law may be effected. (0280E1A01)
- (14c) Five percent of the voters in each country must sign petitions *requesting* that the Republicans *be* allowed to place names of candidates on the general election ballot... (1030E1A01)
- (14d) ...it may defend the privilege of Chandler Robbins to *demand* that Parker *leave* the association. (0320E1D05)
- (14e) A wife may *make* sudden *demands* that she *be* courted, flattered, or coaxed simply because she needs her ego lifted. (1680E1F08)

1.3.3 Verbs of authorization (e.g. authorize)

There are verbs which convey a less strong degree of illocutionary force. In using verbs of legitimatizing (Cf. Fraser 1974:5) or permissive agentives (Cf. Gruber 1965:147), the speaker does not give a command but simply legitimatizes the illocutionary act associated with the proposition by granting an agreement or an authorization. Some of these verbs include *authorize*, *agree* and *grant*₂. For example:

- (15a) The Immigration Office *authorized* that she *be* given full citizenship.
- (15b) He *agreed* that she *see* the psychiatrist.

It is rare for *consent*, *permit* and *forbid* to take the imperative *that*-clause.

1.3.4 Verbs of recommendation (e.g. recommend)

Verbs of recommendation convey illocutionary force of advisability in which the authority of the speaker is probably less acutely felt when compared to verbs of command. These verbs include *advise*₂, *advocate*, *propose*, *recommend* and *suggest*₂:

- (16a) It is *recommended* that panels *be* both glued as well as nailed to the frame. (1670E1E17)
- (16b) It is *recommended* that simple procedures *be* undertaken at once. (0550E1F07)

1.3.5 Verbs of wish/intent (e.g. desire)

Verbs of wish/intent convey the speaker's intention or desire that a certain action be done. Verbs of this type include *desire*, *intend*, *pray* and *prefer*. Verb phrases expressing concern and desires, which belong to this category, attract imperative *that*-clauses as in the following:

- (17a) The... Council *expressed concern*... that more food *be* placed on the eligible list and that neighborhood grocery and variety stores *be* allowed to do business on Sunday. (0790E1A05)
- (17b) They recommended that the entire family be assembled for night prayers followed by a short reading of the Holy Scriptures since the Catholic Church *expresses the desire* that the Sacred Scriptures *be* read. (017071D16)
- (17c) He pitied him and did not *desire* that he *should continue* a sinner forever nor that the sin which surrounded him *should be* immortal and the evil interminable and irremediable. (1130E1D04)

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1.3.6 Verbs of decision/determination (e.g. rule)

Verbs of decision convey decisions and determinations which must be carried out. These verbs include *move*, *ordain*, *resolve*, and *rule*. For example:

- (18a) Mr. Chairman, I *move* that the money *be* used for library books. (Hornby 1974:562)
- (18b) He resolved that nothing *should hold* him back. (Hornby 1974:734)
- (18c) The judge *ruled* that the spy *be* incarcerated.

1.3.7 Verbs of necessity (e.g. necessitate)

Verbs of necessity convey illocutionary force by transmitting urgent needs which must be fulfilled. These verbs include *entail*, *necessitate*, *require* and *stipulate*. For example:

- (19a) The job of Secretary of Labor *requires* that he *be* willing to risk his reputation. (0950E1B05)
- (19b) It was *stipulated* that the goods *should be* delivered within three days. (Hornby 1974:865)

Finally, it should be noted that certain verbs such as *insist*, *rule* and *advise* take either the imperative *that*-clause or the declarative *that*-clause. The former is used if the illocutionary force of insistence, decision or advice is to be conveyed, whereas the latter is used if the locutionary act of presenting a statement is to be performed. Sentences (20a) and (20c) illustrate the first case, while (20b) and (20c), the second case.

- (20a) He *insisted*₂ that it *be* housed in a special museum. (1080E1A40)
- (20b) Its spokesmen *insist*₁ that there *has* not been time enough to institute reforms in military and economic aid policies. (0920E1A04)
- (20c) The Council *advised*₂ the governor that large supermarkets,

factory outlets and department stores not *be* allowed to do business on Sundays. (0880E1A05)

- (20d) The Attorney General has *advised*, local police that it is their duty to enforce the blue laws. (0710E1A05)

1.4 Adjectives which take imperative *that*-clauses

Like verbs of command, certain adjectives which contain expressions of command, necessity, obligation and recommendation attract the imperative *that*-clause as their underlying subject which is extraposed to the right and replaced by *it*. The *that*-clause which is introduced by these adjectives contains verbs that are not inflected for person, number and tense. For example:

- (21a) It is *vital* that the U.S. *make plain* that the onus belongs to the Soviet Union. (1770E1A34)
- (21b) It is not *necessary* that a defendant actually *have* conspired to use the U.S. mails to defraud... (1880E1A10)
- (21c) The councilman said (that) it is also essential that small shopping areas not *be* overlooked. (1050E1A19)
- (21d) That is why it is so very *important* that ethical analysis *keep* clear the problem of decision... (1610E1D11)

The syntactic functions of these adjectives may be attributive as in (22a) in which an adjective modifies a noun, or predicative as in (22b) and (22c) in which adjectives function as object complements:

- (22a) The *important* point is that both *be* satisfied with adjustment. (1740E1F08)
- (22b) Mary considers it *imperative* that John *leave* the country within twenty-four hours.
- (22c) The police think it *advisable* that John *wear* a bullet-proof vest when he travels.

In (22a), the imperative *that*-clause which contains the uninflected

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verb *be* is triggered by the adjective *important* used attributively. In (22b) and (22c) the imperative *that*-clauses are triggered by the adjectives *imperative* and *advisable* used predicatively as the object complements of *consider* and *think*, respectively. These adjectives trigger imperative *that*-clauses since they incorporate ideas that refer to a word of strongly imperative nature, namely those of advisability, urgency and necessity.

1.5 Head nouns which take imperative *that*-clauses

Like verbs and adjectives, head nouns which contain expressions of command, necessity, obligation and recommendation attract imperative *that*-clauses as complex NP complements. For example:

- (23a) Sen. Louis Crump... would aid more than 17000 retailers ... by eliminating the *requirement* that each return *be* notarized. (0820E1A02)
- (23b) It is a *proposal* that justice now *be* served by means other than those that have ever preconditioned the search for it ... in the past. (1470E1D11)

An idiomatic expression such as *on condition that* triggers the imperative *that*-clause although it is not a nominal clause:

- (23c) President Ford yesterday donated the papers and memorabilia of his 28 years in public life to the federal government *on condition (that)* they *be* preserved and exhibited in the State of Michigan. (The Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1976.)

1.6 The hypothetical *should* versus the emotive *should*

It is hypothesized that the hypothetical *should* is contained in the underlying structure of imperative *that*-clauses which are triggered by verbs, adjectives or head nouns that incorporate the ideas of command, request, urgency, advisability and necessity.

This hypothesis is justified by the existence of sentences exemplified earlier in which the imperative *that*-clauses contain verbs which are not inflected for person, number and tense. Further, the existence of grammatical sentences such as (24a) and (25a) as opposed to ungrammatical sentences such as (24b) and (25b) supports the hypothesis:

- (24a) It is *essential* that Mary *not be* overlooked.
- (24b) *It is *essential* that Mary *be not* overlooked.
- (25a) He *advised* the employers that their employees *not be* allowed to strike for more than a month.
- (25b) *He *advised* the employers that their employees *be not* allowed to strike for more than a month.

The grammatical position of *not* which occurs before the verb *be* as in (24a) and (25a) rather than after it cannot be accounted for unless it is hypothesized that *should* has been postulated in the underlying structure and is deleted in the surface structure. If this hypothesis is not correct, there is no way of accounting for the ungrammaticality of (24b) and (25b) in which *not* occurs after the first item of the verb string, which observes the application of the Negation rule. On the other hand, if the Negation rule applies to the underlying structures which contain *should* before the application of the *SHOULD* Deletion rule, the output will be grammatical as in (24a) and (25a).

The surface manifestations of imperative *that*-clauses are different depending on American English or British English. In formal styles, American English favors the deletion of the hypothetical *should* whereas British English tends to keep *should* as exemplified in the following:

- (26a) It is *imperative* that you *should be* on time. (BrE)
- (26b) It is *imperative* that you (*should*) *be* on time. (AmE)

In less formal styles, the two varieties of English favor in-

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fnitival constructions exemplified below:

(26c) It is imperative for us these days to conquer our fears,
to develop the poise that promotes peace. (0730E1D07)

It is necessary to differentiate the hypothetical *should* which is triggered by predicates or head nouns which express the ideas of command, necessity, obligation and recommendation, and the emotive *should* which is triggered by emotive verbs which express human emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow and pleasure. First, compare the following:

(27a) It is *essential* that Mary $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{should leave} \\ \text{leave} \\ \text{*leaves} \end{array} \right\}$ for New York.

(27b) It is *important* that John $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{should be elected} \\ \text{be elected} \\ \text{*is elected} \end{array} \right\}$ chairman.

(28a) It is *disastrous* that the drought $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{should continue} \\ \text{*continue} \\ \text{continues} \end{array} \right\}$
for such a long time.

(28b) It is *regrettable* that Mary $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{should be} \\ \text{*be} \\ \text{is} \end{array} \right\}$ so sick.

There are several differences between (27a-b) and (28a-b). The former contain adjectives of command (or necessity) such as *essential* and *important* which trigger the hypothetical *should* ('ought to') in their *that*-clauses, while the latter contain emotive adjectives such as *disastrous* and *regrettable* which trigger the emotive *should* in their *that*-clauses. Emotive adjectives are those that incorporate expressions of joy, sorrow, surprise and regret. The hypothetical *should* deletion is possible with (27a-b), whereas the emotive *should* deletion is not possible with (28a-b) since the latter cannot have uninflected verbs. The embedded verbs triggered

by emotive adjectives must be inflected for tense, person and number, otherwise the sentences are ungrammatical. Conversely, the embedded verbs triggered by adjectives of command must be uninflected, otherwise the sentences are ungrammatical.

The second difference between (27a-b) and (28a-b) concerns a replacement of *should* by the periphrastic expression *ought to*. First, notice the following:

- (29a) Leave for New York soon.
- (29b) You should leave for New York soon.
- (29c) You ought to leave for New York soon.
- (29d) You have to leave for New York soon.

Sentence (29a) is a direct command while sentences (29b-d) are not. All of them, however, have propositions that are purely requestive. In (29a) the requestive meaning is conveyed by imperative syntactic devices, while in (29b-d) it is conveyed by the presence of a modal *should* and its periphrastic expressions *ought to* and *have to* which refer to obligation. In this sense the hypothetical *should* which occurs in the imperative *that*-clause can be replaced by the meaning of *ought to*. On the other hand, the emotive *should* cannot be paraphrased by *ought to*. For example, the following sentences are semantically anomalous:

- (30a) *It is regrettable that she ought to be so sick.
- (30b) It is disastrous that the drought ought to continue so long.

Now observe the following:

- (31a) It is regrettable that she has to be so sick.
- (31b) It is disastrous that the drought has to continue so long.

The periphrastic expression *have to* has two meanings, one referring to obligation and the other referring to logical necessity. The meaning of *have to* in (29d) is obligation (*have to*₁ = 'obligation'), not logical necessity. Conversely, the meaning of *have to* in

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(31a-b) is logical necessity (*have to*₁ = 'logical necessity'), not obligation. Hence, it is not contradictory to state that the meaning of obligation expressed by *ought to* and *have to*₂ cannot collocate with emotive adjectives, whereas they can collocate with adjectives of command. Only in the sense of logical necessity, *have to*₁ can collocate with emotive adjectives.

The final difference concerns collocations with certain expressions such as *so*, *such*, *like this*, *like that*, *ever* and *at all*. As pointed out by Quirk et al. (1972:823), the emotive *should* frequently occurs with these expressions as in (31a-b), while predicates of command do not have such collocations.

For a summary of the discussion, see Figure 1.

1.7 The infinitival clause after verbs of command

Infinitival constructions are less formal alternatives for *that*-clauses triggered by the verbs of command and are derived from the same underlying structure by Equi #2 whose controller is an object which may or may not be marked by the preposition *to*.

1.7.1 Verbs that undergo Equi #2 with an object controller without TO (e.g. force)

The embedded sentences of the verbs of command may undergo Equi #2 which deletes the subject of the embedded clause under the condition of coreferentiality to the higher object. Verbs of command have an object that is not marked by the preposition *to*. In colloquial speech indirect commands expressed by infinitival clauses are favored over imperative *that*-clauses. For example:

- (32a) The resolution *urges* the governor to make a complete study of the Sunday sales laws. (0810E1A05)
- (32b) Judge G. Murphy... *ordered* him to spend 15 days in the Detroit house of correction. (1300E1A21)
- (32c) The Bible *commands* you to taste and see that the Lord is good. (1640E1D06)

Figure 1.

Type of Verbs	Embedded Commands (Imperative <i>that</i> -clauses)	
(a)	<p><i>*appoint:</i></p> <p><i>command:</i></p> <p><i>decree:</i></p> <p><i>dictate:</i></p> <p><i>direct:</i></p> <p><i>enact:</i></p> <p><i>order:</i></p> <p><i>prescribe:</i></p>	<p><i>*The judge appoints that the witness appear at the court.</i></p> <p>The President <i>commanded</i> that the navy <i>be</i> on the alert.</p> <p>Fate <i>decreed</i> that the son <i>succeed</i> on his father's throne.</p> <p>The chairman <i>dictated</i> that the neighboring countries <i>be</i> conquered.</p> <p>The commander <i>directed</i> that an advance <i>be</i> made during the rainy season.</p> <p>They <i>enacted</i> the law that he <i>be</i> exiled for life.</p> <p>He <i>ordered</i> that she <i>fly</i> home to see her mother.</p> <p>The doctor <i>prescribed</i> that the patient <i>see</i> the psychiatrist.</p>
(b)	<p><i>ask₂:</i></p> <p><i>beg:</i></p> <p><i>demand:</i></p> <p><i>*entreat:</i></p> <p><i>expect₂:</i></p> <p><i>insist₂:</i></p> <p><i>request:</i></p> <p><i>require:</i></p> <p><i>specify:</i></p> <p><i>urge:</i></p>	<p>The lawyer will <i>ask</i> that mercy <i>be</i> granted to his client.</p> <p>The accused will <i>beg</i> that the trial <i>be</i> reopened.</p> <p>The employer <i>demand</i>ed that his employees <i>be</i> on time.</p> <p><i>*He entreats</i> that pardon <i>be</i> given to him.</p> <p>It is <i>expected</i> that he <i>attend</i> the monthly meeting in New York.</p> <p>The tax payers <i>insist</i> that the tax on food <i>be</i> cut.</p> <p>The people in the town <i>requested</i> that the mayor <i>settle</i> their dispute.</p> <p>He <i>requires</i> that his secretary <i>be</i> discrete.</p> <p>The chairman <i>specified</i> that John <i>be</i> promoted.</p> <p>The victims <i>urged</i> that the nuclear plant <i>be</i> removed from their vicinity.</p>
(c)	<p><i>agree:</i></p> <p><i>*allow:</i></p> <p><i>authorize:</i></p> <p><i>*consent:</i></p>	<p>They <i>agreed</i> that John <i>be</i> nominated.</p> <p><i>*He allows</i> that she <i>run</i> for the presidency.</p> <p>The President <i>authorized</i> that the First Lady <i>act</i> for him during the good-will tour.</p> <p><i>*The husband consented</i> that she <i>leave</i> Washington for a month.</p>

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Type of Verbs	Embedded Commands (Imperative <i>that</i> -clauses)	
(c)	<p>*<i>forbid</i>: *<i>grant</i>₂: *<i>permit</i>:</p>	<p>*John <i>forbids</i> that Mary <i>go</i> to see the doctor. The officer <i>grants</i> that the prisoner <i>should go</i> unharmed. *The mother <i>permitted</i> that her daughter <i>drive</i> a car.</p>
(d)	<p><i>advise</i>₂: <i>advocate</i>: *<i>counsel</i>: <i>propose</i>: <i>recommend</i>: <i>suggest</i>₂:</p>	<p>They <i>advised</i> that she <i>start</i> early. The teacher <i>advocated</i> that she <i>not keep</i> her children at home alone. *She <i>counselled</i> that he <i>visit</i> the doctor. He <i>proposed</i> that she <i>stop</i> smoking. The doctor <i>recommends</i> that she <i>try</i> pills for sea-sickness. The witness <i>suggested</i> that the verdict of guilty <i>be repealed</i>.</p>
(e)	<p><i>desire</i>: <i>intend</i>: <i>pray</i>: <i>prefer</i>: *<i>want</i>: <i>will</i>:</p>	<p>He <i>desires</i> that his former wife <i>not return</i> to his house. She <i>intends</i> that the judge <i>investigate</i> the case thoroughly. She <i>prays</i> that her husband <i>be set free</i> from the prison. Arthur <i>prefers</i> that Jennifer <i>not go</i> there alone. *He <i>wants</i> that she <i>be employed</i> soon. God <i>wills</i> that man <i>should be</i> happy.</p>
(f)	<p>*<i>determine</i>: <i>move</i>: <i>ordain</i>: <i>resolve</i>: <i>rule</i>:</p>	<p>*John <i>determines</i> that Mary <i>succeed</i> in his job. He <i>moved</i> that the meeting <i>be adjourned</i> till Monday. God <i>ordained</i> that he <i>die</i> in peace. He <i>resolved</i> that she <i>should not be</i> fired. The doctor <i>ruled</i> that he <i>undergo</i> surgery.</p>
(g)	<p><i>entail</i>: <i>necessitate</i>: <i>stipulate</i>:</p>	<p>It <i>entails</i> that she <i>look</i> after her aging parents and sick children. It <i>necessitates</i> that he <i>contact</i> his office as soon as he arrives at his destination. He <i>stipulates</i> that his goods <i>be delivered</i> within a day.</p>

(a) Verbs of Order

(b) Verbs of Request

(c) Verbs of Authorization

(d) Verbs of Recommendation


(e) Verbs of Wish/Intent

(f) Verbs of Decision/Determination

(g) Verbs of Necessity

- (32d) ... Philadelphia *permitted* him to seek a better connection after he had refused to reconsider his decision to end his career as a player. (0140E1A14)
- (32e) The Junior Achievement Program is designed to give teenagers practical experience in business by *allowing* them actually to form small companies... (1390E1A23)
- (32f) I advise you to make the most of each day. (1140E1F06)

The underlying structure for (32a) is illustrated in (33):



In (33) the verb of request *urge* is a three-place predicate which has three arguments, one of which includes a sentence. The lower subject is deleted by the higher object controller since the former is identical and coreferential to the latter.

1.7.2 Verbs that undergo Equi with an object controller with TO (e.g. scream)


Another type of three-place predicates which have an effect on the behavior of the addressee deals with those which take an intervening NP preceded by the preposition *to*. They are not verbs of command but rather communication verbs. When they take infinitival clauses, however, they incorporate requestive propositions. For example:

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(34a) He *whispered* to me not to reveal the skeleton in the cupboard.

(34b) He *signaled* to me not to mention the touchy subject.

The underlying structure for (34a) is illustrated in (35):



In (35) the lower subject is deleted by Equi under the condition of coreferentiality to the higher indirect object marked by the preposition *to*.

In certain instances, the preposition *for* may appear as well as *to*. Compare the following sentences:

(36a) Max *screamed* for Mary to jump from the window.

(36b) Max *screamed* to Mary to jump from the window.

In both cases the subjects of the embedded clauses are coreferential to the higher indirect objects marked by *for* or *to*. These verbs seem to have the following underlying structure:

(37) Max screamed to X for Y to jump from the window.


In (36a) X is not specified, whereas in (36b) Y is not specified. By default, it is assumed that in both cases X is coreferential to Y ($X=Y$), and hence it is not necessary to specify X and Y together in the underlying structure as in (37).

1.8 Imperative for-to constructions

Adjectives of request, necessity and advisability which take imperative *that*-clauses in formal style take *for-to* constructions in informal style. For example:

- (38a) It is essential for the committee to investigate the roots of the scandal.
- (38b) It is desirable for Jennifer to report the accident to the police.
- (38c) It is imperative for the countries in the world to work for peace.

The underlying structure for (38a) is illustrated in (89):



The complement subject is marked by the *for* complementizer and the complement verb is marked by the infinitive marker *to*. These *for-to* complements introduced by adjectives of request convey requestive propositions.

1.9 Gerundive clauses after verbs of recommendation


Verbs of command which are strongly performative do not usually take gerundive clauses. On the other hand, verbs that are less strongly performative, such as those of permission/prohibition, recommendation, decision and necessity, may take gerundive con-

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structions introduced by the complementizer POSS. The POSS complementizer, which is eventually realized as the possessive marker of the complement subject, triggers gerundivization. For example:

- (40a) John *demanded* Mary's coming to rescue him.
 (40b) David *permitted* Ann's driving a bus to school.
 (40c) The teacher *advocated* Helen's taking the child with her.
 (40d) Bill *recommended* Jane's participating in the discussion.

The underlying structure for (40a) is illustrated in (41) below:



In the surface structure the complement subject is marked by the possessive inflection whereas the complement verb is marked by the gerundive marker *-ing* as in (40a).

Other verbs which are not inherently verbs of recommendation behave like indirect commands when followed by gerundive clauses as objects of prepositions. These verbs take direct objects usually followed by subjectless gerundive clauses which are introduced by prepositions such as *into*, *from*, *against* and *on*. For example:

- (42a) He *coaxed* the baby *into* laughing.
 (42b) The doctor *discouraged* her *from* resuming her work.
 (42c) He *enticed* her *into* robbing a bank.

- (42d) He pressed her into marrying him soon.
- (42e) He advised her against voting for Carter.
- (42f) He tempted her into writing a false check.

These constructions convey requestive propositions by three arguments: the subject NP which initiates a request, the object NP which receives it, and the sentence which refers to the content of the request.

1.10 Co-occurrence restrictions

Stative verbs and adjectives which refer to uncontrollable states cannot occur in imperative sentences. For example:

- (43a) *Resemble John in every way.
- (43b) *Be tall like Harry.

(43a) and (43b) are not usually possible unless used in a special context such as a play in which a person is told to resemble another person or to be tall like Harry.

If the hypothesis is that imperative *that*-clauses are related to direct commands, the same co-occurrence restrictions should hold true for indirect commands:

- (44a) *I command that you resemble John in every day.
- (44b) *I request that you be tall like Harry.

In both direct and indirect commands, it is not possible to command a person to be in a psychological or physical state over which he has no control.

Certain adverbs which are negative in meaning (Cf. Katz-Postal 1964) and which cannot occur in simple commands cannot occur in embedded commands either:

- (45a) *Hardly } complete your work by six o'clock.
 *Scarcely }
- (45b) I ask that you { *hardly } complete your work by six o'clock.
 { *scarcely }

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These adverbs are semantically incompatible with commands since it is contradictory to command that something be done on the one hand, and to minimize the demand on the other.

Adverbs denoting the past cannot occur in simple commands nor in embedded commands:

(46a) *Come yesterday.

(46b) *I command that you come yesterday.

Katz and Postal (1964:76) postulate the underlying future tense for simple commands based on the assumption that the modal *will*, which indicates futurity, appears in the tag questions as in (47):

(47) Go home, { will you?
*did you?
*must you?

Further supporting evidence includes cases in which imperative *that*-clauses cannot co-occur with adverbials referring to the past tense as in (48a) and (48b):

(48a) The President *desires* that friendly relations *be* established between the U.S. and Japan { today and in the future.
*yesterday and in the past.

(48b) The President *desired* that friendly relations *be* established between the U.S. and Japan { today and in the future.
*yesterday and in the past.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that sentences such as (48c) are perfectly acceptable, in which the adverbials referring to the past tense occur as part of the main clause whose verb is in the past.

(48c) The President *desired* yesterday and in the past that friendly relations *be* established between the U.S. and Japan.

This consideration, however, is irrelevant to our discussion.

On the other hand, the tense of the embedded clause intro-

duced by emotive verbs, which trigger the emotive *should*, requires that the time referred to be either the present or the past, but not the future as in the following:

(49a) It is annoying that the neighbors should turn on the radio
 so loudly { today.
 *tomorrow.

(49b) It was annoying that the neighbors should turn on the radio
 so loudly { *tomorrow/*the next day.
 yesterday.

This point offers additional supporting evidence for the necessary distinction between the hypothetical *should* and the emotive *should* discussed in Section 1.6.

1.11 Conclusions

To conclude, then, performative verbs neither describe what the speaker thinks or assumes, nor report what is to be communicated, but rather help perform an illocutionary act in the utterance of a sentence. In saying so, the speaker performs an illocutionary act which is achieved felicitously if certain conditions are met. According to Austin (1962:32), the difference between a simple imperative such as *Go immediately* and an embedded imperative such as *I command that you go immediately* is a matter of implicit versus explicit performatives. In the analysis of Ross (1970b), the former is derived from the latter by the rule of Performative Deletion.

In indirect discourse, the person who commands and the person who receives the command may not be *I* and *you*, respectively. In such cases, the indirect commands are not exactly performatives, but similar to them for two reasons. First, in the analysis of Searle (1969), the complements of verbs of command convey requestive propositions which are equivalent to imperatives, rather than assertive propositions which are equivalent to statements.

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Second, the requestive propositions are accompanied by the illocutionary indicating device which includes predicates that incorporate semantic properties such as command, obligation, request and necessity that attract the imperative *that*-clause whose verb is uninflected for person and tense. In the case of infinitives, the intervening NP must be present in the surface structure as well as in the logical structure as in *He requested her to leave at once*. In the case of gerunds, either the intervening NP or the possessivized subject NP must appear in the surface structure as in *He advised her against smoking* or *He advised against Joan's smoking*. Aside from these facts, there is no neat correlation between the requestive proposition and syntactic behavior.

There are verbs, adjectives and head nouns which incorporate semantic features related to illocutionary force such as command, request, necessity and obligation, which attract imperative *that*-clauses. Verbs that convey illocutionary force can be divided into (a) verbs of order such as *command*, (b) verbs of request such as *request*, (c) verbs of permission/prohibition such as *permit*, (d) verbs of recommendation such as *recommend*, (e) verbs of wish/intent such as *desire*, (f) verbs of decision/determination such as *rule*, (g) verbs of necessity such as *necessitate*. Predicates that refer to commands and requests are strongly performative; those that refer to suggestions and recommendations are weakly performative; those that refer to permissions or authorizations legitimize certain actions.

The imperative *that*-clauses contain the hypothetical *should* in the underlying structure, which is frequently deleted in American English in the surface structure but remains undeleted in British English as in *He insists that she (should) go to see the doctor*. If *should* is present in the surface structure, the reading is ambiguous in that it may be interpreted as a command or a declarative statement with the meaning of obligation.

The hypothetical *should* which is triggered by predicates and

head nouns expressing command and request must be differentiated from the emotive *should* which is triggered by predicates and head nouns expressing human emotions such as joy, sorrow, wonder and regret. These predicates are exemplified by verbs such as *worry*, *regret* and *can't stand*, and adjectives such as *awkward*, *peculiar*, *regrettable*, *annoying* and *annoyed*, while head nouns are exemplified by *pity*. The hypothetical *should* is deletable as in *It is mandatory that Mary should be punctual* or *It is mandatory that Mary be punctual*, whereas the emotive *should* is not deletable unless the verb after *should* is appropriately inflected for person, number and tense. For example, the emotive *should* cannot be deleted from *It is regrettable that Mary should be so sick*, producing **It is regrettable that Mary be so sick*, unless the embedded verb is appropriately inflected as in *It is regrettable that Mary is so sick*.

There are co-occurrence restrictions between the tense of the imperative *that*-clauses and the time adverbials. Since the embedded verbs in the imperative *that*-clauses are inflected for tense, the time adverbials that co-occur with them must refer either to the present or future as in *He commanded that the navy be on the alert today/tomorrow*, but not to the past in *He commanded that the navy be on the alert yesterday*. The latter sentence is obviously grammatical if the time adverbial *yesterday* refers to the matrix rather than the *that*-clause in which case it should precede the subject *he*.

On the other hand, the tense of the embedded verbs introduced by emotive verbs refers to the present or the past, but not to the future as in *It is/was annoying that the neighbors should turn on the radio so loudly today/yesterday*, as opposed to *It is/was annoying that neighbors should turn on the radio so loudly *tomorrow/*the next day*.

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